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Attachment
USIB-D-9.1/14
11 December 1968

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

IBSEC-PR/39

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Security of Classified Materials Selected
for Inclusion in the Johnson Library

1. At the request of the CIA Member of the United States Intelligence Board, the Security Committee has reviewed the procedures respecting security criteria and handling of information selected for inclusion in the Johnson Library.

2. An exploration of the existing policy with regard to any classified material included in a Presidential Library reflects an assurance from the National Archivist that such material will not become available to the public for many years. The National Archives has selected a figure of from 75 to 100 years. In addition, investigation of the physical storage facilities indicates that sensitive materials are stored in a vault, according to community regulations. The Archivist has further assured the Committee that it is Archives policy to maintain extremely strict control over sensitive documents.

3. The Security Committee affirms that in the absence of security regulations promulgated specifically for Presidential libraries, all classified documents forwarded by USIB agencies to the Johnson Library continue to be subject to the safeguards required by EO 10501, and with respect to compartmented information, in the manner prescribed by law and by USIB Directives. Additionally, AEC information must be handled according to the caveats pertaining to Restricted Data.

4. Executive Order 10501 spells out the fact that custodians of classified defense material shall be responsible for providing the best possible protection and accountability for

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DATE	TYPE	CLASSIFICATION	TITLE
1965 14 Jan	TS 190029	TS POU No For Dissem No Dissem Abroad Controlled Dissem	[REDACTED]
1965 26 Apr	TS 186378	TS	OCI Reporting on the 24-25 April Coup in the Dominican Republic
1967 17 Aug	TS 190150	TS	Reaction to a Certain US Course of Action

25X1C

1965

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>25X1C</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
14 Jan	TS 190029/65	TS BUO NFD NDA CD		
26 Apr	TS 186378/65	TS		OCI Reporting on the 24-25 April Coup in the Dominican Republic

1967

17 Aug	TS 190150/67	TS	Reaction to a Certain US Course of Action
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14 Jan	TS 190029/65	TS BUO NFD NDA		
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			<u>1967</u>	
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14 Jan	TS 190029/65	TS BUO NFD NDA CD		
26 Apr	TS 186378/65	TS		Special Reporting on the 24-25 April Coup in the Dominican Republic
17 Aug	TS 190150/67	TS	1967	Reaction to a Certain US Course of Action

1967

Reaction to a Certain US Course of Action

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TS No. 186378/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
26 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

OCI Reporting on the 24-25 April Coup in
the Dominican Republic

1. Since coming to power in December 1963 as President of the Triumvirate, Reid has been faced with almost constant plotting by various factions of the military. This was brought on by his firm position for eliminating graft and corruption on the part of high-ranking military officers. He also made changes in the command structure of the police as well as the military which some officers felt were arbitrary. Reid also alienated much of the general populace with his austerity program aimed at the financial and economic recovery of his country.

2. There have been numerous articles in the President's Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and the Current Intelligence Digest reflecting this general malaise over the past several months. However, there were no articles assessing the precise date of a coup. Excerpts from selected publications follow:

<u>Publication and Date</u>	<u>Gist</u>
President's Daily Brief 17 Apr 65	"The Dominican army chief of staff says that the government is tracking down a coup plot planned for 18 April, aiming at the return of Juan Bosch as president. One of Bosch's men is said to be in Santo Domingo with money to buy up military support. No hard information to support or deny this is available."

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Current Intelligence Digest
13 Apr 65

"The Reid government is taking action against elements in the Dominican military that are continuing to plot against it. ... One group is reportedly planning to establish a military junta that would restore Bosch or Balaguer. The leader of this group is reported to have contacted Bosch in Puerto Rico.... It appears unlikely that this military plotting, which is endemic in the Dominican Republic, will have any success...."

Current Intelligence
Weekly Review
19 Feb 65

"...Opportunistic politicians and recently ousted army and police officials can be expected to take advantage of the current economic hardships to foment business and labor unrest."

Current Intelligence
Weekly Review
22 Jan 65

"Tensions have increased among rival Dominican military leaders. ... Although Reid has successfully maneuvered Peguero's ouster, the ensuing unrest among leaders of the armed forces indicates that his problems with the military are not over."

Central Intelligence Bulletin
21 Jan 65

"...Reid has faced constant opposition in his efforts to assert civilian control over the armed forces and to remove incompetent military leaders. His difficulties with the military are likely to continue."

Central Intelligence Bulletin
1 Dec 64

"A general strike scheduled for 2 December could pose a serious threat to the Reid Cabral regime.

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... [REDACTED] Communist elements, strengthened by the recent return of several leaders deported last spring, are planning to support the strike with acts of violence. ..."

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Briefing prepared for DCI
delivery at congressional
leaders meeting at White
House; 21 Jan 65

"Although opposition to Reid
is weak and disorganized, the
clandestine return to the country
of leading pro-Castro leaders is
a disquieting development."

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29 April 1965

Alerting re Dominican Republic

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24 April.

1. Received call by phone from Intelligence Watch (DDP) at 1545 that [REDACTED] indicated possibility of a coup in Santo Domingo. Operations Center conferred with State [REDACTED] who had no information. STATSPEC

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2. A message [REDACTED] from American Embassy re coup rumors received at 1620. On basis of this we conferred with White House Situation Room, DIA, State Department, NIC, NSA, and NMCC. We briefed Mr. Graham, Acting AD/CI for weekend, and the DDI. It was decided not to alert higher until more information available.

3. Additional conferences with White House and FBI occurred and briefings were provided to Mr. Helms, Mr. R.J. Smith, [REDACTED] Chief of OCI Latin American Division, [REDACTED] of OCI Western Area, [REDACTED] of DDP Western Hemisphere Division, and the Director's Security Aide between 1800 and 2040. 25X1A 25X1A

25 April.

25X1D

1. Since situation appeared to have quieted down nothing more was done until 1132 when [REDACTED] indicated Reid government had fallen.

2. The usual conferences with other operations centers were set in motion and DDI, AD/CI, and [REDACTED] were all alerted. The DDI asked for a memorandum for Monday morning on the background of the difficulties. 25X1A

25X1A

3. [REDACTED] and two analysts came in about noon and remained through the evening and the Branch Chief responsible for the Dominican Republic came in at midnight until morning. A late brief for the CIB, an updating memorandum, a background memorandum, and a post-mortem on reporting were available at opening of business.

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26 April - 28 April.

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25X1A

1. As the situation deteriorated, DDP decided about noon 26 April to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and OCI has had a man [REDACTED] since that time. As information becomes available, it is phoned to the Operations Center from which it is relayed to the AD/CI, DDI, and the Director's Office. Further copies of what appears [REDACTED] have not been available until the information is received through regular channels--CIA, State or Military.

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2. Cooperation between DDP and DDI has been excellent and as fast as information is available it is relayed and alerting procedures set in motion. We have been in constant contact with Military, State, and White House centers.

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OCI Reporting on Leftist
Dangers in the Coup.

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Intelligence Memorandum
26 Apr 65

"Unless a compromise military junta is quickly organized, the Dominican Republic seems headed for a return of Bosch supported by his party, some elements of the military, Communists, and leftist-oriented groups. The extreme left seems better organized than Bosch's own party or those elements of the military on his side. On the basis of his past record it seems unlikely Bosch would be capable of curbing his Communist support."

Memorandum For The Record
27 Apr 65
Subject: The Dominican Republic Another Cuba?

"Should the forces of General Elias Wessin y Wessin, supported by the major elements of the air force and elements of the navy over the next several hours or days be unable to defeat that revolution that started last Saturday, the Dominican Republic in my opinion will be so far on the way to becoming another Cuba that the tide may well not be able to be turned back, unless the US takes prompt and strong action."

Intelligence Memorandum
28 Apr 65

"The Communists appear to be making an all-out effort in Santo Domingo. Although resistance by the army rebels and some of the supporters of Juan Bosch seems to have collapsed in the last 24 hours the upheavals of the last few days and the willingness of Bosch's followers to distribute arms to

civilians has given the Communists and other extreme left elements an opportunity. They have successfully resisted attacks by Wessin's loyal troops throughout the day, and Wessin's group is now calling for US help."


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MEMORANDUM

Reaction to a Certain US Course of Action

Top Secret

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17 August 1967
T.S. No.190150

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18 August 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Reactions To A Certain US Course of Action

In this paper we attempt to assess Soviet and Chinese reactions to the closure by the US of North Vietnamese ports by mining supplemented by bombing.

The Soviet Reaction

1. The USSR's policy toward the war in Vietnam has been constrained by a concern that developing events might bring it into direct confrontation with US military power. The closing of North Vietnamese ports to Soviet merchant ships would create such a situation. It would face the USSR with the most difficult decision it has yet had to make with respect to the war and with respect to its relations with the US in the light of the war. The USSR would recognize that this action, whatever its purposes, would constitute a challenge to itself involving its political prestige. Even if the Soviets elected to follow a prudent course and not to meet the challenge head on, the result would be, we believe, to raise the tension in US-Soviet relations to the highest level since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates.

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2. Our judgment concerning the initial Soviet responses to the US action remains essentially what it was in May: * the Soviets would probably not counter US interdiction with their own naval forces or initiate a new crisis in another area (e.g., Berlin or Korea). We still think the Soviets would accept that they must rely on the rail lines across China--which already carry the great bulk of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam--for the transport of its other assistance. Having turned away from direct confrontation, however, the Soviets would mount a vigorous political and propaganda counter-action. This would be designed to convince the US that it was paying a very high political price for its actions and initiating a dangerous phase in its relations with the USSR. It would be accompanied by diplomatic steps aimed at arousing condemnation of the US action and at generating international alarm. We think the hostility of the Soviet response would color US-Soviet relations for considerable time to come.

3. While reaffirming this net judgment, we should note certain developments since May which would affect Soviet calculations, and which increase the hazards in any attempt to forecast the Soviet response in detail. Chief among these is the Middle East crisis of June, which has almost certainly made the Soviet leaders more sensitive to challenges to their prestige, particularly in the Vietnam context, where they have a deeper political and emotional commitment than in the Middle East. While recent frustrations--possibly reinforced by domestic pressures for a more forward policy--would probably cause the Soviets to develop an even more vigorous political and diplomatic campaign than they might previously have done, we do not believe this sensitivity would impel the USSR to retaliate with the high risk actions discounted above.

*In Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War, SNIE 11-11-67, 4 May 1967, Secret and in Reactions to Various US Courses of Action, 23 May 1967, No. 0646/67, Secret.

4. Within these limitations, we believe the Soviets would feel a strong compulsion to demonstrate that they were not standing idly by. They would at a minimum pledge to provide the North Vietnamese with additional quantities of weapons and perhaps be readier than before to supply new and more sophisticated types.* Soviet spokesmen would again begin to speak of sending "volunteers" to North Vietnam on the condition that the North Vietnamese were to ask for them. The threat to do so would become more credible in the face of US escalation and would be taken in many quarters as a sign of rising international tension. Moscow would seek in a variety of ways to make it clear that the US action had done great harm to US-Soviet relations and had impaired the prospects for fruitful dealings between the two great powers on issues of international concern. This could be shown by a hardening of the Soviet attitude concerning moves toward settlement of Middle East problems. The Soviets would almost certainly pull back from an nonproliferation agreement, refuse to enter into discussions with the US on ABM defenses, and sharply curtail US-Soviet cultural contacts. The Soviets could be expected to make a vigorous attack in the UN designed to put the US in the dock as a reckless and aggressive flouter of international law and practice.

5. Soviet calculations with respect to Vietnam are, as always, intimately related to the Chinese question, and Moscow's assessment of this factor has probably altered since last May. The growing chaos in China and recent US bombing of the rail lines from China to North Vietnam cast some doubt on the reliability of land transit via China, and increase the difficulties and uncertainties Moscow must cope with in providing military aid to Hanoi, which now comes mainly by this route. This consideration would necessarily loom larger if North Vietnamese

*For an examination of the types of Soviet weapons which might be provided see SNIE 11-11-67, para 12, 4 May 1967, Secret.

ports were blocked because there is no feasible third route of supply. An air lift is not a practicable substitute.

6. We do not think it likely that the overland route will be ruptured, either as a result of Chinese spite or of internal difficulties in China.* If, however, this were to happen, we do not exclude the possibility that the USSR, despite its anger toward the US, would conclude that the only realistic course available to it and to North Vietnam would be to search harder for a political solution to the conflict. We can only foresee this happening, however, if Moscow were convinced that the North Vietnamese will to resist had been seriously undermined and that Hanoi was ready to seek Moscow's help in bringing about such a solution. If this were not the case, Moscow would, we believe, remove itself even further from efforts to arrange a settlement.

7. We have not tried to examine the whole range of possible Soviet response. In the political sphere in particular the range is wide. Nor can we be confident that the Soviet response would not be more militant in some circumstances, e.g., if a Soviet ship were to be sunk in Haiphong harbor. We continue to think that, barring such contingencies, the odds are against the Soviets taking drastic measures, but that their political response would be strongly antagonistic and perhaps long lasting.

The Chinese Reaction

8. Peking has indicated that it would come into the war if China were attacked, if US forces invaded North Vietnam, or if the imminent collapse of Hanoi threatened to bring US power close to the Chinese frontier. Short of these situations we continue to estimate that Peking will not elect to significantly increase Chinese involvement in Vietnam. In particular we continue to think, as we did

*But see paragraph 13.

last May, that interdiction of Haiphong would not in itself compel the Chinese to undertake significant new military actions.*

9. There is, in fact, little that Peking could do in direct response to the mining of Haiphong. The Chinese could supply North Vietnam with mine-sweeping equipment and would probably offer to do so. They might also offer assistance in setting up across-the-beach facilities for bringing supplies ashore.

10. Peking would probably estimate that other actions such as introducing combat troops into North Vietnam would not be an appropriate or effective response, although it might make them available to Hanoi if Hanoi asked for them. In this connection, as China's domestic confusion has increased Peking has paid progressively less attention to the Vietnamese problem and appears to have become somewhat more cautious. This caution would probably also be reflected in Chinese employment of their airforce. In the past Peking has been careful to avoid actions which carried a clear risk of US counterstrikes and would in this instance be unlikely to threaten US naval units in the Tonkin Gulf or commit the Chinese airforce in an attempted defense of North Vietnamese airspace. The Chinese might, however, become more sensitive to air strikes near their border, and the chances of Sino-US air clashes in the border region would increase.

11. Peking's principal interest is to see the war in Vietnam continue. Chinese policy for the past two years has been aimed at keeping the Vietnamese Communists in the field at minimum risk to China. We believe closure of the Vietnamese ports would not alter Peking's policy line. The Chinese would respond publicly with a new barrage of anti-US propaganda. Privately they would seek to reassure Hanoi that the Chinese rail system--which carries the bulk of the war material supplied to North Vietnam by both China and the USSR--would continue to function.

*See ONE Top Secret Memorandum TS-186025, 26 May 1967.

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12. Peking would do its best to back up these promises by special efforts aimed at keeping traffic bound for Vietnam rolling. In addition, Peking would probably offer to compensate for the logistic pinch resulting from port closures by increasing the amount of material sent in by rail. As part of this effort the Chinese would probably honor Vietnamese requests for additional engineer, logistics and air defense troops if they were made by Hanoi.

13. Our present judgment is that Chinese support for Hanoi would be maintained except in the event that China fragments politically, which on balance we think unlikely. But as the disorder and confusion within China continue and increase, we become less and less confident that Peking can in fact keep the trains running. In any case, it is likely that serious interruptions will occur from time to time.

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